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7170-2'13 
[L A. No. 19448. In Bank. May 2, 1947.] 
H. N. ISENBBRG, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA EM-
PLOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION et al., 
Appellants, 
[la, Ib] Unemployment Insurance - Re1a.tion of Employer and 
Employee-Burden of Proof.-In an action by an owner of • 
string of horses to recover contributions paid under protest, 
in accordance with the Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 
1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), 
on the remuneration received by free-lance jockeys perform-
ing services for plaintiff, defendant commission does not have 
the burden of showing that control was actually exercised by 
plaintiff or his trainer over the jockeys. 
[2] Usages and Oustoms - Use. - The existence of a contractual ' 
right may be shown by usages and customs. ' 
[8] Unemployment Insurance - Relations of Employer and Em-' 
ployee.-One who is an employee within the meaning of Lab. 
Code, § 3351 (Workmen's Compensation Act), is engaged in 
employment within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance· 
Act, § 6.5, the definitions of employment in both statutes being 
substantially the same. ;. 
[4] lei. - Relation of Employer and Employee - Evidence.-In aD' 
action by an owner of a string of horses to recover eontri-· 
butions paid under protest on the remuneration received by' 
jockeys performing services for plaintiff, evidence of the b";' 
lief of the jockeys that they would not be rehired if they 
failed to follow instructions of the plaintiff or his trainer i!! 
relevant to IIhow their submission to control :£ 
[1] See 10 Oal . .Tur.10-Yr.Supp. (Pocket Part), "Social Security:' 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Unemployment Insurance; {Sl 
i l1sapi &lid o.toma, I" 
i 
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[6] Id.-Relation of Employer and Employee-Evidence.-In an 
action by an owner of a !'tring of horses to recover contri-
butions paid under protest on the r{'muneration received by 
jockcys performing- servjl1c8 fo]' plaintiff. it was error for the 
trial ~ourt to holcl that thp jockeys were not employees where, 
of the seconclnrv "lements hv which to d('termine the relation, 
all were prese;Jt or inappiicable and. 80 far as the right 
of control wa~ C(HICernecl. there was no evidence from which 
it could reasonably have drawn an~' inference inconsistent 
with the conclusion that plaintiff had the right to control the 
activities of the jockeys except when he was prevented from 
doing so by the rules of the racing board or by the inaccessi. 
bility of the jockeys while they were actively engaged in • 
race. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to recover unemployment insurance contributions 
paid under protest. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn 
and Doris H. Maier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Ap-
pellants. 
John Moore Robinson for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action pursuant 
to scction 45.10 of the California Unemployment Insur-
alice Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's 
Gcn. Laws, Act 8780d) to recover contributions paid under 
protest on the remuneration received by free-lance jockeys 
performing services for plaintiff during the period from 
~pl'il 1, 1944, to June 30, 1944. Defendant appeals from a 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
During the period in question plaintiff owned a b'tring 
of horses that he raced at Bay Meadows race track. He 
engaged free-lance jockeys to ride the horses in various 
raccs. They were not in his regular employment but were 
engaged separately for each race. In March, 1941, the 
California Employment Stabilization Commission ruled that 
the free-lance jockeys involved were in "employment" within ~Ie meaning of section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance 
~. and that any remuneration paid to the jockeys was 
. au Jcct to contributions as provided in the act. 
) 
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The evidence at the trial related in the main to the customs 
and practices of the owners of race horses and the trainers 
generally in employing jockeys, and their control over the 
jockeys' activities in riding the horses. Plaintiff testi1led that 
he had no written agreement or understanding with the 
jockeys in question other than a standard form signed by the 
jockeys' agents specifying the jockey's name, the race, the 
date, and the first and second calla.. There was no other evi-
dence of any specific agreement, written or oral between the 
plaintiff and the jockeys whose services are involved in this 
case. Neither plaintitI nor defendant introduced any compe-
tenat evidence as to the actual control exercised over the 
jockeys in question by the plaintiff and his trainer. The 
evidence showed that the jockeys, through agents, contracted 
with the owners to ride particular horses in particular races. 
In accordance with rule 278 of the rules adopted by the Cali· 
fornia Horse Racing Board pursuant to chapter 769, Statutes 
of 1933, the remuneration for the services of these jockeys 
was $35 when they won a race and $15 when they lost. Such 
remuneration was received by all jockeys in the absence of 
specific contract provisions to the contrary. It was shown 
that it is the custom for a jockey to report to the jockey 
room with his personal riding equipment at noon on the day 
of the race; that he changes into silks furnished by the owner 
and then proceeds to the paddock, where he meets with the 
owner or trainer. At this time either the owner or the trainer. 
acting as the owner's agent. gives instructions 88 to the run-
ning of the race and the handling of the horse; but, under 
rule 323(a) of the rules of the California Horse Racing Board. 
the owner or trainer can give no instructions or orders that 
do not have as their objective the winning of the race, unless 
the owner has more than one horse entered in the same race. 
If the owner or trainer does not wish the horse to be whipped, 
he may 80 instruct the jockey, but he cannot enforce such an 
instruction unless he has the whip taken from the horse upon 
application to the stewards, in which case no whip may be 
used on that particular horse until, upon the application of 
the owner or trainer. the stewards change the ruling. The 
owner must pay the jockey the contract price in the event he 
discharges the jockey without cause before the running of the 
race. Obviously, neither the owner nor the trainer can dill-
charge the jockey while he is engaged in running the race. 
After the race, the owner or trainer US\lRI1~' conferR with the 
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did not do as expected, the rcasons therefor. If it is ap-
parent that the jockey did not follow instructions, the 
owner does not engage the jockey to ride again. 
[la] There is no conflict in the evidence as to the facts 
outlined above, but plaintiff contends that defendant had 
the burden of showing the actual control exercised by plain-
tiff or his trainer over the jockeys in question, and since de-
fendant failed to show that such control was actually exer-
cised, the jockeys were properly held not to be employees. It 
is clear. however, that plaintiff made no showing that the 
owner or trainer did not exercise, or have the right to exer-
cise. control except in so far as the right to exercise control 
was limited by the rules of the California Horse Racing 
Board or by the inaccessibility of the jockeys while actively 
engaged in the race. The only finding of fact made by the 
trial court on the question of employment was a general 
finding that during the period in question the free-lance 
jockeys engaged by plaintiff were not employees and the com-
pensa,tion paid them consisted of payments to independent 
contractors. The basis of this finding is clear from the 
memorandum opinion of the trial court. The trial court not 
only decided the case on the theory that the actual control 
exercised by the particular taxpayer over those performing 
services for him determines their relationship but placed the 
burden of proof on the defendant commission to show that 
control was actual1y exercised. It thus distinguished Drillon 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 346, 351 [110 P.2d 64], 
upholding a determination by the Industrial Accident Com-
mission that free-lance jockeys are employees· within the 
.meaning of section 3351 of the Labor Code. The facts in that 
case are substantially the same as those in the present case 
except that the right to control.was shown by its actual 
exercise (cf Connell v. Harris, 23 Cal.App. 537, 542 [138 P. 
9491; see 19 A.L.R. 226, 240) rather than by the customs 
and practices of the occupation. [2] Clearly. the existence 
of a contractual right may be shown by usages and customs. 
(See Hind v. Oriental Products Co., Inc., 195 Cal. 655, 667 
[235 P. 438).) 
[lb] The decision in the Dril10n case was based on the 
right of the owner to exercise control over the jockeys (supra, 
at 355), the principal test of employment under section 6.5 
of thr Fnemplo~'ment Insnrnnec Art (Empire Star Mines Co. 
v. California Emp. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 33, 43 [168 P.2d 686]). 
) 
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It was held that statutes and administrative regulations de-
signed for public protection, such as the rules of the racing 
board, even though they may limit the principal's right of 
control, do not remove persons performing services for others 
under the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In the present ca.se the same reasoning is applicable to the 
same rule.". (See California Emp. Stab. Com. V. Morris, 28 
Ca1.2d 812, 817 [172 P.2d 497].) Hence, the ultimate fact..~ 
of this case are indistinguishable from those in Drillon v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., supra. Even if it is assumed that the 
actual exercise of control rather than the right to control 
is the crucial element in this case, it clearly is not the law 
that the burden of proof is on the taxing authority in an 
action by a taxpayer to recover taxes on the ground that 
they were illegally assessed. (See United States V. Ander.!on. 
269 U.S. 422, 443 [46 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed. 347]; 3 Cooley, 
Law of Taxation; 4th ed., § 1307; and see Robinson v. George. 
16 Ca1.2d 238. 244 [105 P.2d 914], holding that the bur· 
den of proof generally is on the party attaekinll the em· 
ployment relationship.) 
[3] It cannot seriously be contended that one who is 
an employee within the meaning of section 3351 of the 
Labor Code (Workmen's Compensation Act) is not fl..ngaged 
in "employment" within the meaning of section 6.5 of the 
California Unemployment Insurance Act. Section 3351 of 
the Labor Code provides that "Employee" means every 
person in the service of an employer under any appoint-
ment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or im· 
plied, oral or written. . . ." An employer is defined by 
section 3300 of the Labor Code to include "Every person 
including any public "ervice corporation, which has any 
natural person in service." Section 6.5 of the Unemploy. 
ment Insurance Act defines employment as "service . . . 
performed for wages or under an,v contract of hire. written 
or oral, expre.o;s or implied." 
It has been held that the word "employment" as defined in 
section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance Act does not 
include independent contractors. (Briggs v. California Emp. 
Com., 28 Ca1.2d 50, 54 [168 P.2d 6961.) In Empire Star 
Mines Co. v. California Employment Commission, 28 Cal.2d 
33, 43 [168 P.2d 686], this court set forth the rules for the 
determination of the question whether or not a person is an 
independent contractor or is engaged in employment under 
I / 
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section 6.5. The principal test of the employment relation-
ship was held to be the "right to control over the manner 
and means of accomplishing the result desired." Strong 
evidence of thiR right is shown by the right of the princi-
pal to discharge the worker. The secondary tests are listed 
in that opinion as including, "(a) whether or not the one 
performing service is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; (b) the kind of occupation. with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the principal or by a specialist without super· 
vision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(d) whether the principal or workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the persons doing th(' 
work; (e) the length of time foJ' which the services are to be 
performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by time or 
by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regu-
lar business of the principal: (h) whether or not the par-
tieR believe they are creating the relationship of employer. 
employee. (Rest., Agency, § 220; Cal.Ann. § 220_)" 
It haR already been observed with regard to the principal 
test. that the owner or trainer has the right of control except 
in so far as he is limited by the rules of the racing board. 
The right to discharge in this case is limited only by the 
rule that the owner may not discharge a jockey without 
cause unless he pays the contract price. There is no ques-
tion that the owner may dischar.ge a jockey up to the time 
he is out on the track and physically out of his control. 
As in any contract of employment for a fixed period, an 
employee prematurely discharged without cause may re-
cover damages based on his wages. (W. F. Boardman Co. v. 
Petch, 186 Cal. 476. 483. f199 P. 1047]; ct. Drillon v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com., supra, at 354.) 
Among the secondary elements of the employment relation, 
only three are clearly absent from this case: (c) Jockeys are 
. not unskilled workmen; however, many skilled workmen are 
employees. (e) Free-lance jockeys are employed for a fixed 
period, the duration of one race. (f) The basis of payment 
is the race, not the time involved. The other elements are 
either present or inapplicable to this case: (a) The occupa-
tion is an integral part of the owner's business. (b) The 
work is usually performed under the direction of the owner or 
trainer to the extent allowed by the rules of the California 
Horse Racing Board. (d) Although the jockeys furnishes hh~ 
) 
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personal riding equipment the silb and the horse are fur-· 
nished by the owner. (g) The question whether horse racing 
is the regular business or occupation of owners of race horses 
is immaterial in determining whether jockeys are employees. 
The plaintiff made no showing that it WI8 not his regular 
occupation and testided that he could not say what his regular 
occupation was. (h) The belief of the parties as to the reta-
tioDship created is relevant only to indicate whether or not 
there WI8 an 888UDlption of control by the principal and 1JUb-
mission thereto by the worker. (Rest., Agency, § 220, com-
ment (i).) [4] There WI8 no evidence in regard to the 
belief of the parties 88 to their relationship at the time the 
services were performed. The belief of the jockeys, however, 
that they would not be rehired if they failed to follow in-
structions is relevant to show their submission to control. 
[I] Plaintiff contends that the judgment cannot be re-
versed, since it is based on a conclusion drawn from the evi-
dence 88 an inference· of fact, not 88 a conclusion of law. 
There WI8 no evidence from which the trial court could reason-
ably have drawn any inference inconsistent with the conclu-
sion that the plaintiff had the right to control the activities 
of the jockeys except where he was prevented from doing 80 
by the rules of the Racing Board or by the inaccessibility of 
the jockeys while they were actively engaged in the race. The 
contention that the question whether a person is an employee 
under section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance Act is 
wholly one of fact, even when the evidence is not in conftiet 
and not reasonably susceptible of eon1licting inferences, is 
untenable. Under such a rule there would be nothing to 
prevent con1lieting interpretations of identical facts by the 
various trial courts 80 that free-lance jockeys would some-
times be cIassi1led 88 employees and sometimes not. Such 
a rule would make effective enforcement of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act impossible. 
In CtJli/of'fl/la Bmp. Stab. Com. v. JlOf'f'il, 28 Cal.2d 812, 
818 (172 P.2d 497], this court, applying the same rule as that 
applied in the Drillon case, npra, held that the Real Estate 
Act in 80 far as it regulates real estate salesmen for the protec-
tion of the public is not relevant to the question whether sueh 
salesmen are employees under section 6.5 of the California Un-
employment Insurance Act. The court stated that II. • • the 
occupation of real estate salesmen, in 80 far as the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act is concerned, is one that may be classified 
) 
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as that of an employee, or an independent contractor, de-
pending upon the facts of the particular case." Clearly this 
statement does not mean that the trial courts of the state can 
conclude that, under section 6.5, one real estate salesman is 
an employee while another operating under identical facts is 
not. It means that whether a particular type of real estate 
salesman is within the purview of the act depends on the 
facts involved in the relationship between such salesmen 
and their principals rather than on some statute that has 
no relation to unemployment insurance. 
The result of the application of the rules of law set forth 
in Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, 
will depend in any particular case on the essential facts of 
that case. Thus, in California Emp. Com. v. Bates, 24 Ca1.2d 
432, 436 [150 P.2d 192], the judgment of the trial court was 
reversed because the conclusion of the trial court from the 
facts was inconsistent with the decision in California Emp. 
Com. v. Los Angeles Down Town Shopping News Corp., 24 
Ca1.2d 421, 425 [150 P.2d 186], where the facts were sub-
stantially the same. This holding is in accord with the rule, 
particularly applicable to public law cases where uniformity 
of decision is important, that if the essential facts are not in 
conflict the question of the legal relations arising therefrom 
is a question of law. (Leis v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 213 Cal. 256, 258 [2 P.2d 26] j San Diego Trust & 
Savings Bank v. San Diego County, 16 Ca1.2d 142, 153 [105 
P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-In my opinion, the decision in this case 
departs from the established rule that the judgment of the 
trial court will not be disturbed if there. is substantial 
evidence to support its determination. Giving' full effect to 
the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from it, the finding that an independent contractor relation-
ship existed between the owner and the jockeys should be 
upheld. As stated by the trial judge in his memorandum 
of opinion, "there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
establish the fact that the jockeys in question were inde-
pendent contractors although the evidence is in dispute." 
) 
) 
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I agree that the burden of establishing an independent 
contractor relationship is upon the party attacking the de-
termination of employment (see Industrial Ind. Exch. v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Ca1.2d 130, 136 [156 P.2d 926]). 
Quite evidently that rule was followed in the trial of this case, 
and, in any event, this court may not rely upon an error of 
law found in a memorandum of opinion as a basis for reversal. 
(DeCou v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741 [214 P. 444]; see Witkin. 
New Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 109.) 
A jockey, ealled as a witness in behalf of Isenberg, testi-
fied, "I think the procedure is, that if an owner is willing 
to pay a rider his fee, that he can substitute a rider." This 
was in answer to the question as to whether it was "possible 
for . . . [the jockey] . . . to be removed from that mount 
without the horse being taken out of the raee'" As indi-
cated by other testimony of this witness, he was not neces-
sarily referring to the rules of the Racing Board, and it 
reas6nab1y may be inferred that in his statement as to "the 
procedure" he was referring to the agreement of the parties 
of the national custom. 
There was also evidence from which it re&SODI\bly could be 
inferred that the jockeys were not required to follow instruc-
tions given them. One jockey testified that "His trainer 
Eii>metimes gave ... [him] ••. instructions how he thought 
a horse would run best." But, he added: "They [owner and 
trainer] have suggested ways of riding them [horses]: I 
wouldn't say they told me just how to ride them. That is 
impossible." As to whether or not such instructions were 
followed, he testified, "Well. if I found out that the horse 
wasn't running under those instructions, I would try some 
other means of getting him to run." This witness also testi-
fied that the owner "may leave it up to your own judgment" 
as to manner in which the jockey should ride. When a.~ked 
whether he used his own judgment when riding a race, 
he replied : "Yes, you· have to use your own judgment. In-
structions are followed only when you don't figure in your 
own judgment that they hinder the chances of winning." 
It is the well settled rule that when there is a conflict in the 
evidence, including not only objective facts but also the 
inferences which reasonably may be deduced therefrom, the 
determination of the trial oourt, in regard to the legal re-
lationship of the parties to a controversy, will not be dis-
. turbed. (California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Norins Realty Co., 
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Morris, 28 Ca1.2d 81l! [172 P.2d 497); Twentieth etc. Lites 
v. California Dept. Emp., 28 Ca1.2d 56 [168 P.2d 699]; 
Briggs v. California Emp. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 50 [168 P.2d 
696]; Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28 
Ca1.2d 33 [168 P.2d 686].) And although strong evidence in 
support of an employment relationship is the right to dis-
charge at will, without cause, the fact that a person's services 
may not be so terminated justifies the finding of an inde-
pendent contractor relationship (B1'iggs v. California Emp. 
Com., supra, p. 54; Empire Star Mines Co. v. California 
Emp. Com., supra, p. 45). 
The testimony quoted clearly warrants a conclusion of lack 
of control, and there i8 other evidence which supports the 
t.rial court's determination. The jockey furnished most of 
his own equipment. The method of payment was by the race, 
not according to the time involved. Jockeys are skilled work-
ers and are employed for a fi."{ed period, the duration of the 
race. Giving no effect to the rules of the Racing Board, the 
trial court had ample ground for deciding that an inde-
pendent contractor relationship existed between the owner 
and the jockeys. Evidence that, by cnstom, the owner or 
trainer had the right to give instructions to the jockey, 
merely raised a conflict in the evidence which was resolved 
by the trier of fact. Furthermore, the rules of the Racing 
Board limit the right of the owner and trainer to control 
the activities of the jockeys and. therefore, support the find-
ing of an independent contractor relationship. 
Neither California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Morris, supra, nor 
Drillon v. Industrial Acc. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 346 [110 P.2d 64], 
is inconsistent with this conclusion. In the Morris case, the 
trial court found that certain real estate salesmen were inde-
pendent contractors. Upon appeal from the judgment, the 
commission contended that the Real Estate Act gave a broker 
the right to control a salesman in certain ways and, thet'cfore, 
as a matter of law, and regardless of a. trial court's finding, 
all real estate salesmen were employees. Rejecting this con-
tention, the court held that there was evidence to support the 
finding of the lack of control, and the proyisions of the Real 
Estate Act did not compel a contrary determination. In the 
Drillon case, the Industrial Accident Commission decided 
that certain jockeys were employees. As requiring a reversal 
of the judgment, the taxpa~'er relied upon the rules of the 
Racing Board which restrict the rir--ht of an owner and 
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was urged, establish, as a matter of law, that a jockey is 
an independent contractor. But the court refused to so 
construe them, and held that the evidence supported the 
trial court's determination. 
These cases are clearly distinguishable from the situation 
presented in the record now under review. Here the trier of 
fact determined that the jockeys who rode Isenberg's horses 
were independent contractors. The commission attacks the 
decision upon the ground that the only evidence in the record 
which supports the trial court's i'uding of lack of control is 
the limitations found in the rules of the Racing Board. The 
issue in this regard, therefore, is whether the rules may be 
used to 8tlpport a finding of the trial court. In the Morris 
and Drillon cases, the question was whether, when there is 
evidence to support the finding of the trial court or com-
mission, may the rules of the Racing Board or the regulatory 
provisions of the Real Estate Act be invoked to compel a 
determination contrary to those findings. Both the Morris 
and the Drillon eases hold that the eifect of such rules or 
regulations is, at most, to set up a conflict in the evidence: 
they may not be used to require findings contrary to those 
made by the trial court upon substantial evidence. 
Also, I do not agree with the strong implication in the 
majority opinion that the determination of the legal relation-
ship is primarily a question of law. This implication is found 
in the reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the 
holding, in eifeet, that the Drillon case controls the disposition 
of the present controversy, and the direction that judgment 
be entered in favor of the commission. Moreover, the ease.'1 of 
California Emp. Com.. v. Los Angeles Down Town Skopp~ng 
News Corp., 24 Cal.2d 421 [150 P.2d 186], and California 
Emp. Com. v. Bates, 24 Ca1.2d 432 f150 P.2d 192]. are cited 
as standing for the proposition that whether persons are inde· 
pendent contractors or employees is, in eifect. a question of 
law. On the contrary, in the 1irst of these cases the decision 
was based upon the proposition that "there is substantial 
evidence to support the findings of the trial court that the 
boys were employees within the meaning of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act. • . ." The ground of decision in the 
Bates ease was that there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding of an independent contractor 
relationship. This is quite different from the present state-
ment that the judgment in favor of Bates "was reversed be-
cause the conclusion of the trial court from the facta was 
) 
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inconsistent with the decision in California Employment 
Commission v. L. A. Shopping News Corporation, 24 Ca1.2d 
421, 425 [150 P.2d 186], where the facts were substan-
tially the same." 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I agree with the views ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Edmonds. I am thoroughly cognizant 
of the (at least to the involved agencies) administrative desir-
ability of having a simple, absolute, and universal or rule of 
thumb method for clas.<iifying entire industrial or professional 
groups as employees or nonemployees. But that desirability 
certainly does not warrant this court in departing from consti-
tutional standards. Is it the intention of the majority of this 
court to hold that a!l a matter of law all jockeys who ride 
horse for compensation, regardless of the more specific terms 
of their several contracts, are employees' If that is not the 
effect of the holding its avowed object is not attained. If that 
is the effect of the holding it means that stable owners and 
riders no longer are permitted the freedom of mutually con-
tracting such reciprocal relationships as they may agree upon. 
No longer do they have the right or capacity to establISh the 
character of their obligations to each other. No matter how 
specific may be the terms by which they agree that the rider 
is a skilled specialist, that he shall furnish his own equipment, 
that he shall undertake a single project to be performed in his 
own way without any supervision or direction of the owner, 
the result will be the same as though the converse of all 
those heretofore material elements were substituted. 
It is difficult for me to believe that the majority actually 
subscribe to the doctrine above indicated. But if they do not 
subscribe to it then not only do they fail to achieve the assert-
edly desirable objective of administrative universality but the 
only other rational basis for their holding in this case is 
equally disturbing It means not that there shall be uni-
formity in classifying all jockeys as employees but that the 
majority have weighed the evidence in this one case and have 
themselves elected to draw inferences contrary to those drawn 
by the trial court. The evidence related by MI'. Justice 
Edmonds is in the record. It admits of the inferences sug-
gested by him. Those inferences support the trial court's 
judgment. The functions of trial and appellate courts are 
) 
) 
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constitutionally disparate and no rule should be more scrupu-
lously observed by courts of appeal than that in their appel1ate 
work they should not encroach upon or usurp a trial court 
function. The resolution of factual questionR including the 
determination of the inferences to be drawn from the evidenc 
whether that evidence be documentary or undisputed or other 
wise, is in a major sense exclusively the province of the trial 
court (or of the jury). It is exclusive in the trial court (or 
jury) in the sense that the appellate court is given no right to 
resolve factual con:6icts or to indulge its preference as to the 
selection of inferences from the evidence. It is only where 
elearly there is no substantial evidence from which essential 
inferences can be drawn that the appellate court may prop-
erly interfere in a factual sense; and its interference then 
mould be both in form and in substance by a statement of the 
law, not a declaration of fact. Any other course by an appel-
late court is dictatorial in nature and tends toward depriv-
ing litigants of the constitutional standards of a fair trial. 
The principles involved in this case are markedly similar 
to those in Cardillo v. Liberly Mut1UJl 1M. CO. (1947), -
U.S. - [67 S.Ct. 801. 91 L.Ed. -J. There the eritieal 
question was whether the injury was one "arising out of and 
in the course of employment." In a proceeding before the 
commissioner nnder the District of Columbia Workmen's Com-
pensation Act it had been found that the injury which resulted 
in the decedent's death· had 80 arisen and an award was made 
to the widow. The employer and in.'lUrance carrier brought 
action in the district court to annn! the award; they contended 
that there was "a lack of substantial evidence" to support the 
essential finding. The district court held that the findin.gs 
"were supported by evidence in the record" but the Court 
of Appeals· reversed. The Supreme Court in reversing the 
Court of Appeals and reinstating the judgment of the district 
court said: (pp. 806-807 of 67 S.Ct.) "In determining whether 
a particular injury arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment, the Deputy Commissioner must necessarily draw an 
inference from what he has fonnd to be the basic facta. • • • 
If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, 
the Deputy Commissioner's inference that an injury did or 
did not arise out of and in the course of employment is eon-
elusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference 
because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor 
ea:A the opposite inference be substituted by the court because 
/ 
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of a belief that the one chosen by the Deputy Commissioner 
is factually questionable. Voehl v. lndemnity Ins. Co., supra 
[288 U.S.], 166 [53 S.Ct. 380, 77 L.Ed. 678, 87 A.L.R. 245]; 
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 287 [56 S.Ct. 190, 80 
L.Ed. 229J; South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 257-
258 [60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732]; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 
3]4 U.S. 244, 246 [62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184]; Davis v. De-
partment of Labor, supra [317 U.S.], 256 [63 S.Ct. 225, 87 
L.Ed.250]. 
"It matters not that the basic facts from which the Deputy 
Commissioner draws this inference are undisputed rather than 
contro,'erted. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 293 
[66 S.Ct. 120, 90 L.Ed. 78, 166 A.L.R. 708]. It is likewise 
immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse infer-
ences. The Deputy Commissioner alone is charged with the 
duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most rea-
sonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be 
disturbed by a reviewing court. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, supra 
[296 U.S.], 287 [56 S.Ct. 190. 80 L.Ed. 233]. Moreover, the 
fact that the inference of the type here made by the Deputy 
Commissioner involves an application of a broad statutory 
term or phrase to a slJeci(ic set of facts gives rise to no greater 
scope of judicial review. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 
322 U.S. 111, 131 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170]; Commis-
sioner v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 124 [65 S.Ct. 
169, 89 L.Ed. 113]; Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143 r67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. --]. 
Even if such an inference be considered more legal than fac-
tual in nature, the reviewing court's function is exhausted 
when it becomes evident that the Deputy Commissioner's 
choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not forbid-
den by the law." (Italics added.) 
Again, in an action which originated in a state court under 
the Federal Employers Liability Act (35 StatS. 65, as amended, 
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and which was before the United States 
Supreme Court on certiorari after the state Supreme Court 
had reversed a trial court "for insufficiency of evidence to 
show negligence," the high scourt said (Ellis v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. (1947), 329 U.S. 649 [67 S.Ct. 598, 600, 91 
L.Ed. --]) "The choice of conflicting versions of the way 
the accident happened, the decision as to which witness was 
telling the truth, the inferences to be draH'n from uncon-
troverted as well as controverted facts, at'e questions for the 
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jury. Tennant v. Peoria ct P. U. B. Co., 321 U.S. 29 [64 
S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520); Lavender v. Kurn, supra [327 U.S. 
645 (66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916).] Once there is a reason. 
able basis in the record for concluding that there was negli. 
gence which caused the injury, it is irrelevant that fail'. 
minded men might reach a different conclusion. For then it 
would be an invasion of the jury's function for an appellate 
court to draw contrary inferences or to conclude that a dif. 
ferent con('lusion would be more reasonable." (Italics added.) 
To the same effect is EagZes v. United States ex rel Samuels 
(1946), 329 U.S. 304 [67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. -] (the 
case of a selective service registrant seeking to evade service 
as a theological student), where the court, in recognizing the 
force of that class of practical evidence which so often appears 
to the fact finder but which cannot be reflected in a phono-
graphic record, said: "A registrant might seek a theological 
school as a refuge for the duration of the war. Congress did 
not create the exemption . . . for him. There was some evi. 
dence that this was Samuels' plan; and that evidence, coupled 
with his demeanor and attitude, might have seemed more per. 
suasive to the boards than it does in the cold record. Out' 
inquiry is ended when we are unable to say that the board 
flouted the command of Congress in denying Samuels the ex· 
emption." (Italics added.) See, also, Estate of Bristol 
(1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689]. 
For the reasons above set forth I would affirm the judg. 
ment of the trial court. . 
